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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
ALBERT PFAFF,
Plaintiff and Respondent

vs.
ETHEL MILLER PFAFF,
Defendant and Appellant

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Albert Pfaff, plaintiff and respondent, brought this
action to obtain a divorce on the ground of the defendant's alleged cruelty, causing him great mental distress.
Ethel Miller Pfaff, his wife, by her answer denied
plaintiff's allegations of cruel treatment and of any
ownership by him in a dwelling and three lots in Moultrie,
Georgia, standing of record in her name, and claimed equal
ownership with the plaintiff of the Oldsmobile sedan automobile mentioned in the pleadings.
In her counterclaim she sought a divorce on the
grounds of cruelty, wilful desertion and wilful neglect
of the plaintiff to provide for her the common necessaries of life.
The trial court found that the plaintiff was not
entitled to a divorce and granted a divorce to the defend-
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ant on the ground of the plaintiff's wilful desertion of
the defendant for more than one year; restored her former
name of Miller; awarded her alimony for a period of six
months at $127.50 per month; awarded her the dwelling
and three lots in Georgia, and required the plaintiff to
pay her attorney's fee and costs; and awarded the Oldsmobile automobile to the plaintiff.
This appeal is from the decree granting the divorce
and requiring the plaintiff to pay her $765.00 only, in
six monthly payments of $127.50.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE REAL ESTATE IN MOULTRIE, GEORGIA, ALTHOUGH ACQUIRED BY THE DEFENDANT DURING COVERTURE, WAS
OWNED BY HER ALONE, FREE OF ANY
INTEREST OR CLAIM OF THE PLAINTIFF.
There can be no controversy as to the exclusive
ownership of the home and lots in Georgia by the defendant. By her own sweat and tears she paid the price
for that property and naturally took title in her own
name. The money paid was her own earnings and an
inheritance, and the balance due was paid by her assumption of a mortgage on the premises held by the Federal
Land Bank. (Tr. 15) The money sent to the defendant
by the plaintiff was the living allowance which he as a
member of the Armed Forces was obligated to make for
his wife. She testified (Tr. 22) that the allotment was
$100.00 per month. From "running a cafe", together
with an inheritance which she drew in the sum of $500.00
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from her mother's estate, she accumulated approximately
$1,600.00, which she used as a down payment on the
Moultrie property. At the time of the trial she testified
that she still owed $800.00 on the property (Tr. 24), on
which balance she is paying monthly instalments.
For two years she waited for him to come home;
"I was alone looking for him every day, waiting for him
to come home ... I wanted the fryers for him." (Tr 36)
The appellant's position is that the Court was in
error in finding as a fact (Finding No.7) that the parties
(both) were owners of a home and three lots in Moultrie,
Georgia, and this the appellant asserts as an abuse of the
court's descretion and not based on facts established by
competent or any evidence. If this be so, then the only
relief granted to the defendant was the requirement that
the plaintiff should pay her $127.50 per month for a
period of six months only.
POINT II
THE AWARD OF ALIMONY IS INADEQUATE, INEQUITABLE AND UNJUST.
The equities and peculiar circumstances of the case
warrant the appellate court in exercising its own judgment in regard to the trial court's complete termination
of all support to the defendant at the end of six months,
irrespective of the trial court's findings. The allowance of
$127.50 for six months only was grossly inadequate and
is unjust, and equity and justice require that this court
interfere.
The rule is stated in the following language quoted
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from the case of Dahlberg v. Dahlberg, 77 Utah 157, at
page 162:
"We think the rule contended for by the plaintiff
is the correct rule, and is in line with the later
cases from this jurisdiction."
The rule referred to is " ... that the kind of division or the amount of
an allowance to be made is dependent upon the
facts, circumstances, and conditions of each particular case, and, if upon a consideration of them
the division or allowance as made by the court
below is inadequate or unjust, this court is justified, and it is its duty to interfere, and that, to do
so, it is not essential to show an abuse of discretion in the court below, that it is enough, if upon
the record presented, the court below erred in
making the division or allowance and that equity
and justice require an interference and a modification thereof ... Of course, the rights and equities of both parties are to be considered, but, whatever doubt there may be concerning the matter,
it ought to be resolved against the guilty party
whose fault and wrongs and breaches of the marital relation destroyed the home and forced or
brought about the separation."
Further, at page 164:
"The question thus is as to whether on the facts
found the division and allowance were equitable
and just. As to that, a divorce proceeding being
an action in equity, the parties, under our Con-
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stitution, are entitled to our judgment, as well
as that of the trial court."
In the case of Hendricks v Hendricks, 91 Utah 533,
at page 558, this court said:

"It is likewise well settled in this state that where
the appeal is on the question of the propriety
of the judgment for alimony, this court is required
to review the evidence in the nature of a trial de
novo on the record, and the appellant is entitled
to the judgment of this court, as well as the trial
court, on this question.
"It has further been determined by this court, as
shown in the above cases, and cases therein cited,
that it is not necessary for this court to find a
gross abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court before modifying the judgment as to alimony and that no general rule as to the amount
of alimony can be laid down to follow in all cases,
but the decree in each case must be determined
upon the facts, the conditions, and the circumstances of the parties in each particular case, and
that if, upon examination of the record, this court
is convinced that the award in the trial court is
inequitable and unjust, it should direct such decree
as it finds to be just and equitable. The amount
of alimony is measured by the wife's needs and
requirements, considering her station in life, and
upon the husband's ability to pay."
In the case of Openshaw v Openshaw, 80 Utah 9,
at pages 18 and 19, this court said:
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". . . It is an ancient doctrine of the common
law that it is the duty of a husband to support
his wife. Such is still the law of this state, despite the many changes which have been made
in modern times in the law respecting the civil
and political status of married women. This duty
of support does not end when the marriage is
dissolved by a decree of divorce rendered at the
suit of the wife for the husband's matrimonial
wrongs; but it continues so long as they both shall
live, the wife remains unmarried and needs such
support, and the husband is able to provide the
same. (Italics supplied) It is measured by the
wife's reasonable needs and requirements, considering her condition and station in life, and the
husband's ability to pay."
In the case of Hampton v Hampton, 86 Utah 570,
at page 572, this court reaffirms the rule that it is not
necessary for this court to find a gross abuse of discretion
on the part of the trial court before modifying the judgment as to alimony, and
"that no general rule as to the amount of alimony
can be laid down to follow in all cases, but the
decree in each case must be determined upon the
facts, the conditions, and circumstances of the
parties in each particular case, and that if, upon
examination of the record, this court is convinced
that the award in the trial court is inequitable and
unjust, then this court should direct such decree
as it finds to be just and equitable. The amount
of alimony is measured by the wife's needs and
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requirements considering her station in life and
upon the husband's ability to pay."
(Italics
supplied)

CONCLUSION
Certainly, when the wife is forced by the misconduct of the husband to seek separation, she ought to
receive sufficient support for her maintenance, regardless
of her ability to work and contribute to her own support,
as stated in the Dahlberg case, supra.
The review is in effect a trial de novo on the record.
Appellant asks for additional counsel fees for the
prosecution of this appeal, and her costs on appeal.
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the
trial court should be reversed and the case remanded
for further trial and disposition, as this court may determine.

JOSEPH E. EVANS,
Suite 517 Eccles Building,
Ogden, Utah
Attorney for Appellant.
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